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The biological basis of complex human social interaction and communication has been illuminated
through a coming together of various methods and disciplines. Among these are comparative studies
ofother species,studies ofdisordersofsocial cognitionand developmental psychology. The use ofneu-
roimaging and computational models has given weight to speculations about the evolution of social
behaviour and culture in human societies. We highlight some networks of the social brain relevant to
two-person interactions and consider the social signals between interacting partners that activate
thesenetworks.We makeacasefordistinguishingbetweensignalsthatautomatically trigger interaction
andcooperationandostensivesignalsthatareuseddeliberately.Wesuggestthatthisostensivesignalling
is needed for ‘closing the loop’ in two-person interactions, where the partners each know that they have
the intention to communicate. The use of deliberate social signals can serve to increase reputation and
trust and facilitates teaching. This is likely to be a critical factor in the steep cultural ascent of mankind.
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We humans tend to think that we are the most social of
all animals and our social lives the most fascinating.
Surely our social nature has contributed to our success
as a species. Yet, it is only recently that students of the
human mind and brain have begun to explore the bio-
logical basis of our social abilities and their evolution
(Adolphs 1999; Ochsner & Lieberman 2001). Of
course, social psychologists have been investigating
social behaviour for upwards of a century, but this
work, which has contributed valuable insights on
how people inﬂuence each other, occurred largely in
isolation from the rest of neurobiology. Instead, the
impetus for the recent marriage of social psychology
with neurobiology came from comparative studies pro-
viding us with the term ‘social brain’ (Brothers 1990).
This social brain, for humans at least, has a ‘theory of
mind’, which enables us to predict what others are
going to do on the basis of their desires and beliefs.
It also has a ‘mirror system’, which enables us to
understand others’ goals and intentions and to
empathize with their emotions by a mechanism of
motor resonance. These systems are triggered by
social signals, and in this paper, we will consider the
nature and function of these signals in a ﬁctitious
two-way interaction with an unknown agent.
Take a typical Star Trek scenario of being stranded
on an alien planet. Are there any living beings? Are
they hostile or friendly? Are they like you? You need
their help—and perhaps they need yours. Perhaps you
can cooperate with them. Your social brain should be
able to guide you to ﬁnd answers to some of these ques-
tions. We start with involuntary signals and later move
on to deliberate signals of communication.
1. INVOLUNTARY SOCIAL SIGNALS
(a) Is ‘it’ an agent?
Every time we move we send out involuntary signals
about ourselves (this has been termed ‘public infor-
mation’; Danchin et al. 2004). These signals
inevitably tell others that we are agents. Motion
dynamics seem to provide very good cues for agency.
Motion cues can be isolated using point-light displays
(Johansson 1973). In such displays, all information is
removed except motion by showing only a few points
of light located on major joints such as knees and
shoulders of a person. Experiments have shown that
biological motion can be picked out from other types
of motion (Scholl & Tremoulet 2000). Furthermore,
gender and emotion can be recognized from the move-
ments of a point-light walker (Kozlowski & Cutting
1977; Dittrich et al. 1996). Biological motion of this
type elicits activity in the superior temporal sulcus
(STS; ﬁgure 1), especially the posterior part (pSTS).
Single cells that respond to biological motion have
also been identiﬁed in this brain region in the
monkey (Puce & Perrett 2003). Detecting and dis-
tinguishing different kinds of biological motion is
important for recognizing prey and predators as well
as conspeciﬁcs. This is likely to be a very basic and
universal brain mechanism, critical to survival.
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As soon as we have established we are facing another
agent, we interpret the cause of the movement. Even
infants perceive moving agents as having goals and
expect them to achieve these goals in a rational way,
e.g. by moving along the shortest path (Csibra et al.
1999). When two agents act contingently, then we per-
ceive that one caused the behaviour of the other. In our
scenario, it is not necessary that the agent looks like a
human. It is remarkably easy to imbue even a shapeless
object with intentions as long as it appears to move in
response to something you do or say (Johnson 2003).
Heider & Simmel (1944) showed that geometric
shapes moving in a silent animation evoked attributions
of intentions in ordinary viewers. This effect is highly
robust and has been investigated in neuroimaging
studies in terms of intuitive attribution of mental
states (Castelli et al.2 0 0 0 ). Activation of pSTS was
seen, as well as of other regions relevant to theory of
mind (ﬁgure 1). This suggests that perception of
biological motion and the attribution of intention and
other mental states share a common neural basis.
(c) How can I know what ‘it’ will do next?
‘It’does not look anything like us, but it moves contin-
gently to our movements. Nevertheless, if it is like us
deep down, then we can read its intentions from noth-
ing but patterns of movements. One idea is that we do
this via prediction (Kilner et al. 2007). Given that the
object we are observing is animate and has a particular
goal or intention, we can predict what movement it will
make next. We then observe how well our prediction
actually matches the next movement. On the basis of
the prediction error we can update our reading of the
goal or intention.
Evidence that pSTS is involved in such a process
comes from two sources. First, pSTS activity is
indeed modiﬁed by prior expectations. Wheatley
et al. (2007) used an ingenious design in which partici-
pants were shown an object that moved in a ﬁgure-of-
eight path. In one condition this object was presented
as a spinning top (inanimate), while in another con-
dition it was presented as an ice skater (animate).
More activity was elicited in pSTS when this
movement was perceived as representing an ice
skater. Second, pSTS activity is greater when the
movement does not ﬁt with the expected intention,
suggesting that this activity reﬂects prediction error
(Pelphrey et al. 2003, 2004; Saxe et al. 2004).
Recently, Behrens et al.( 2 0 0 8 )directly investigated
learning via prediction error by using a task where the
precisepredictionsofparticipantsand,hence,prediction
errors,couldbeestimatedforeverytrial.Thesocialcom-
ponent of this task consisted of a message from an
informant who indicated tothe participant, withvarying
degrees of accuracy, what their next response should be.
A prediction error occurred when this indication turned
out to be unexpectedly wrong (or unexpectedly right).
Critically, these prediction errors elicited activity in
pSTS. At the same time, prediction errors about the
(non-social) value of an object elicited activity in
the striatum, in line with ﬁndings from a number of pre-
vious experiments. Prediction error learning is an all-
purpose mechanism and not speciﬁcally dedicated to
social cognition. This is a useful reminder that even
when the task in question is learning from other crea-
tures, the critical computations need not be unique to
social interactions.
(d) What does ‘it’ know?
We can do even better in predicting what the alien crea-
ture will do next if we attribute and take into account its
knowledge and beliefs. Knowing what other agents do
not know is as important as knowing what they do
know. There is now evidence (Samson et al.i np r e s s )
that we automatically represent the knowledge of
others created by their point of view. If someone else
is in the room with us, and they can only see two of
the four objects that we can see, the mere presence of
this other person interferes with our ability to say that
we can see four objects. We are slowed down when
this clash of views occurs compared with when there
is no such clash. This observation leads us to speculate
that humans have a strong drive to ﬁll in the gaps in
other people’s knowledge. There are few activities
more delightful than acquiring some secret information
that we can then impart to other people in conﬁdence
(Spacks 1982). In contrast, withholding information
from others and deliberately deceiving them requires
considerable mental effort (Vrij et al. 2006).
Ifwenoticethatthealiencannotseewhatwecansee,
then we have a certain advantage. We might hide some-
thing from its line of sight or else make sure we bring
something into its line of sight. This kind of
perspective taking does not need to be social. For
example, we need to be able recognize that a place or
an object is the same when we see it again from a differ-
ent point of view. Tasks in which people have to infer
what an object would look like from a different position
(Aichhorn et al. 2005) elicit activity in temporo-parietal
junction, a brain region closely adjacent to pSTS. This
region is also activated by tasks in which it is necessary
to take account of a person’s out-of-date (and hence
false) belief as opposed to taking account of an out-of
date photograph (Saxe & Kanwisher 2003). These are
both tasks that create a stark contrast of perspectives:
one spatial and the other mental.
Figure 1. Observation of biological motion elicits activity in
STS. The schematic ﬁgure shows regions where observation
of many different kinds of biological motion elicits activity
along STS (adapted from Allison, Puce & McCarthy, Trends
Cogn. Sci. 2000).
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When we interact with another person it is helpful to
know something about their mental states, such as
their desires, knowledge and beliefs, because this is
better than anything else for predicting what they are
going to do next. This vague insight was brought
under experimental control by a ‘False Belief’ task
developed by Wimmer & Perner (1983). For instance,
we can tell where Maxi will look for his chocolate even
though it has been moved to a different place when he
was not there. In fact, a typical 5 year old can give you
a complete explanation when given this test, and if you
measure eye movements, then even infants 10–15
months old are surprised if Maxi looks in the wrong
place (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007).
When we communicate with another person we also
depend on an implicit and spontaneous understanding
of mental states. For instance, we do not tell another
person what we think they know already, and likewise
they expect us to tell them something new (Grice
1989).Ifwefollowthedarkside,wecandeceiveandcon-
trol others by taking advantage of their ignorance and
making them believe things that are not true. In either
case, it is important to know about the beliefs of others
and to recognize that these beliefs may be different
from our own and may not correspond with reality.
As yet it is not clear whether we are talking about
a uniquely human ability. Premack & Woodruff
(1978) ﬁrst asked the question ‘Does the Chimpanzee
have a theory of mind?’ It still remains controversial
whether non-human primates (Povinelli & Vonk
2003; Tomasello et al. 2003) engage in mentalizing,
as revealed, for instance, in deliberate deception.
What is not controversial is that our human ability
to deliberately deceive and manipulate the minds of
others far outstrips that of any other creature.
However, not all humans develop this ability. Baron-
Cohen et al. (1985) showed that children with autism
have great difﬁculty with False Belief tasks while being
able to perform other kinds of problem-solving tasks at
anormallevel.Evenadultswithautismcannotanticipate
with their eye gaze where Maxi will reach to retrieve the
chocolate (Senju et al. 2009). This in sharp contrast to
normally developing children and adults.
Autism is deﬁned by core deﬁcits in social and
communicative behaviour. If you observe a classically
autistic child, then you can see in devastating clarity
what it means not to have a spontaneous understanding
ofmentalstates.Mentalizingfailure,or‘mindblindness’,
served as a highly successful explanation for the charac-
teristic social impairments in autism. For example, it
explained the inability to understand deception in the
presence of intact understanding of sabotage (Sodian &
Frith 1992), or the inability to understand irony with
good understanding of metaphor (Happe 1993). The
idea of a circumscribed mentalizing failure in autism
suggested that there might be a dedicated brain system
thatisengagedwhensolving problemsthatrequire men-
talizing, a prediction that was conﬁrmed by a series of
subsequent brain imaging studies (Frith & Frith 2003;
Saxe et al.2 0 0 4 ). As expected, this system shows mal-
function in autism as shown, for instance, in ﬁgure 2
(Castelli et al. 2002; see also Zilbovicius et al.2 0 0 6 ;
Kana et al.2 0 0 9 ).
(f) Is ‘it’—deep down—like me?
You may be tempted to attribute psychological states
to the alien creature, but there are other checks to
see if this alien feels like us. Can we tune in to each
other in a way we do automatically with other
humans? We tend to covertly imitate other people
and feel some kind of resonance with their emotions.
(g) ‘It’ imitates me!
When two people ‘tune in’ to each other, they tend
unconsciously to imitate each other’s movements and
gestures and this is known as the chameleon effect
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Figure 2. Areas of activity elicited by watching triangles whose movements evoke attributions of intentions. Activity is seen in extra-
striateareas(aandb)speciﬁctothevisualnatureofthestimuliaswellasin(a)temporalpole,(c)STSand(d)medialprefrontalcortex,
regionswhereactivityhasbeenelicitedbyawiderangeoftasksevokingmentalizing.Thediagram(e)contrastsactivityintheseareasin
volunteerswithAsperger’ssyndrome(darkblue)andcontrols(lightblue).Aspergerindividualsshowedlessactivityinareasassociated
with mentalizing: basal temporal, STS, medial prefrontal, but not extra-striate regions (based on data from Castelli et al.2 0 0 2 ).
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the degree of imitation, the more the partners feel
they have good rapport and empathy. When someone
has been covertly imitated they become generally
more prosocial and will give more money to charity
(van Baaren et al. 2004). However, such effects do
not occur if we become aware that we are being imi-
tated (Lakin & Chartrand 2003). The feeling that we
are part of a group, driven by unconscious motor
and emotional resonance, appears to be intrinsically
rewarding (Tabibnia & Lieberman 2007).
(h) But not always
There are powerful factors that modulate motor reson-
ance, acting through high-level systems that involve
knowledge and beliefs. Less motor resonance is
observed when our partner is a robot rather than a
person (Kilner et al. 2003). This effect seems to
depend more upon our belief about the nature of the
agent than on the detailed behaviour of that agent
(Stanley et al. 2007). Resonance is also modulated
by the strength of the interaction (ﬁgure 3). Thus, it
tends to be stronger when we have eye contact (Bavelas
et al. 1986; Kilner et al. 2006).
Obviously, motor imitation is not always appropri-
ate for successful interactions. For successful joint
action the most important requirement is a common
goal. To achieve this requires that most actions
should be complementary rather than identical
(Sebanz et al. 2006). Further, when pairs of subjects
perform complementary tasks, each covertly rep-
resents the task requirements of the other. We can
see this most strongly when the concurrent represen-
tation of another person’s goal interferes with our
own goal. This was shown in a joint task where two
people each pressed only one button in response to a
potentially incompatible aspect of the same stimulus
(Sebanz 2003).
Observation and imitation of the actions of others
elicit activity in inferior frontal gyrus and in inferior
parietal cortex. Since these are the regions where
mirror neurons have been found in monkeys, they
are often identiﬁed with a human mirror system for
action (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), which we discuss
further below. Remarkably, and underlining the key
role of this mechanism for successful and coordinated
social interaction, when subjects are trained to per-
form complementary actions, even greater activity
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Figure 3. Motor resonance is modiﬁed by social interaction. Magnetoencephalography signals were measured while volunteers
watched a video of an actor moving their left or right arm up and down (lower panel). Oscillations in the alpha-frequency range
were relatively greater in parietal cortex contralateral to the hand being observed (middle panels), but only when the actor was
facing the observer (adapted from Kilner, Marchant & Frith, Soc. Cogn. Affect Neurosci. 2006).
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(i) Brief excursion: the brain’s mirror system
The discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ in macaque monkeys
(Rizzolatti et al.1 9 9 6 ) was a milestone in the progress of
social cognitive neuroscience. These neurons, so far
observed in regions corresponding to inferior frontal
cortex and inferior parietal cortex, ﬁre when the
animal performs a speciﬁc action (seeing a peanut
being grasped) and also when the animal observes the
same speciﬁc action (grasping the peanut) being per-
formed by someone else. The implication of these
ﬁndings is that the observation of an action automati-
cally activates the brain regions concerned with
execution of that same action in the observer (Rizzolatti
et al.1 9 9 9 ). Mirror neurons point to a plausible neural
mechanism not only for understanding the goals and
intentions of others (Gallese et al.2 0 0 4 ) but also for
empathy (Decety & Myer 2008).
Mirror neurons have yet to be deﬁnitively identiﬁed
in humans (Dinstein et al. 2008; but see Kilner et al.
2009). However, there is plenty of evidence for
resonance behaviour in humans at the behavioural
and the physiological level. Just think of fans at a foot-
ball match who seemingly act in unison and express
the same emotions. By recording from facial muscles
Dimberg et al. (2000) showed that people automati-
cally tend to imitate the emotional expression
(frowns or smiles) seen in another face. Resonance
to emotional expressions seems also to occur in non-
human species (de Waal 2004). However, in
humans, emotional resonance can also be elicited
indirectly. The mere knowledge that someone else is
currently in pain is enough to elicit activity in brain
regions associated with the experience of pain
(Singer et al. 2004) as shown in ﬁgure 4. You would
be very impressed if the alien, seeing that you are
injured, tried to help you.
2. DELIBERATE SOCIAL SIGNALS
By now, purely through involuntary signals given out
by movement, the alien in our Star Trek scenario has
been revealed as a creature very much like a human.
Let us assume it has a kind of social brain, but does
not speak a human language. How do you both
achieve a mode of communication using deliberate
signals?
(a) How can you know ‘it’ wants to communicate
with you?
Let us suppose the creature is sending out a signal.
How do you know it is a signal meant for you? You
need to recognize that the creature wants you to
attend to it. Signals that attract your attention are
called ostensive. They carry with them the promise
that the receiver shall gain some beneﬁt from attending
to the message (Sperber & Wilson 1995). An ostensive
gesture could be visually minimal but attentionally
highly conspicuous, such as the eyebrow ﬂash (Eibl-
Eibesfeldt 1972). Once a sender has initiated com-
munication, for instance by using the eyebrow ﬂash,
then you, the receiver, will be trying to infer what
the sender intends you to understand. We have specu-
lated that anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex
(arMPFC), in which activity is elicited by many men-
talizing tasks, may have a critical role in the special
kind of representation that closes the loop between
minds (Amodio & Frith 2006). Ostensive gestures
in different modalities (eye contact and calling your
name, without a message following these signals)
elicit activity in arMPFC (Kampe et al. 2003).
(b) ‘It’ wants to teach you
As everyone knows, it is possible to learn simply by
observing others, but that is not the same as teaching.
Deliberate teaching seems to be a special feature of
human interactions that is not found in other primates
(Maestripieri et al. 2002). Infants will follow the
actions of adults if they are preceded by an ostensive
gesture, but not otherwise (Senju & Csibra 2008).
This ability is critical for learning words (Bloom
2002). First, infants can recognize when the parent is
naming an object for them to learn and can distinguish
this from situations in which spoken words and objects
come together incidentally (Baldwin et al. 1996).
Second, using their mentalizing ability, infants can
pick out the person who knows something from the
person who does not, and pay special attention
to the signals coming from the one who knows
(Sabbagh & Baldwin 2001). It is this ability to pick
out the signals that are reliable and have communica-
tive intent that enables infants to learn at the
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Figure 4. Activity is elicited in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) by the experience of pain in the self (green line in graph on right)
and by a signal indicating that a loved one is receiving pain (red line in graph on right) (adapted from Singer et al., Science 2004).
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These observations suggest that humans have a special
ability and perhaps even a basic desire to deliberately
impart and receive knowledge from each other.
Csibra & Gergely (2006) have proposed that pedagogy
is a unique human ability that makes cultural
accomplishments possible in the ﬁrst place.
(c) Closing the loop: ‘it reciprocates’
By now the alien will have revealed itself as a human in
all but outside appearance. Can you be sure it is not a
robot designed to mimic human behaviour? You can
apply some more tests of its ability to communicate
like a human. One particularly convincing sign of
interaction is what we call ‘closing the loop’ (Frith
2007). Here is an example: we admit that by writing
this paper we are attempting to inﬂuence you. But
this is matched by your attempt to absorb our message
and extract from it what you ﬁnd useful. This is
enough, but there might be consequences. You might
be stung into criticizing and refuting some of our
points. We, as authors, would then ﬁnd out whether
we explained some points badly so that you misunder-
stood them, or whether we ourselves had
misunderstood some matters and hence misrepre-
sented the facts. As a result of the exchange we
would all have learned something we did not know
before. This sort of exchange would be both a painful
and satisfying example of ‘closing of the loop’. As the
example also shows, mentalizing, the ability to attri-
bute knowledge and beliefs, is heavily involved in this
process.
(d) Mechanisms of mutual inﬂuence
A good way to approach this question is to study the
behaviour of partners in competitive games in the lab-
oratory. Here, it is not only important to predict what a
partner will do next but also what a partner expects us
to do next. Hampton et al. (2008) have developed a
computational model of a strategy that allows us to
represent such second-order expectations (ﬁgure 5).
They call this the ‘inﬂuence’ learning model because
it involves tracking the inﬂuence of one’s own actions
on one’s opponent. They contrast this strategy with
two less sophisticated strategies: one, predicting what
the opponent will do next based on the opponent’s
prior actions; the other, predicting which action is
most likely to win based on one’s own past experience.
In terms of their behaviour, the performance of
people playing the competitive inspector game was
best accounted for by the inﬂuence learning model.
Hampton and his colleagues also identiﬁed brain
regions where activity reﬂected the behaviour of the
components of this model. They conclude that activity
in arMPFC tracks the expected reward given the
degree of inﬂuence one’s past actions have on
the opponent. In contrast, activity in pSTS reﬂects
an update signal, capturing the difference between
the expected degree of inﬂuence and the actual inﬂu-
ence. This is consistent with the role of this region
we have discussed previously in being more active
when people’s behaviour is not what we have pre-
dicted. This work could lead towards a methodology
for elucidating the neural mechanisms underlying the
complexities of social and strategic interactions (see
also Yoshida et al. 2008).
(b) influence update modulated by likelihood difference
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Figure 5. Activity is elicited when volunteers play the inspector game. The upper panel (a) shows activity elicited in left and
right STS when the opponents’ move is not what the players expect on the basis of how much inﬂuence they think they are
exerting on their opponents. The lower panel (b) shows that there is more activity in medial prefrontal cortex in players
who base their strategy on working out how much inﬂuence they have on their opponents. Yellow: p , 0.001; light orange:
p , 0.05; dark orange p , 0.01. Adapted from Hampton, Bossaerts & O’Doherty, Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 2008. Copyright
(2008) National Academy of Sciences, USA.
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If it looks like you are stuck for a while on your
new planet, then you might do well to cooperate
with the alien and join or even start a new civiliza-
tion. It has been argued that the capacity for social
cooperation is the lever that allowed the rapid
ascent of human culture and civilization (Herrmann
et al. 2007). We propose that this capacity relies on
the explicit ability to communicate via ostensive sig-
nals based on the ability to mentalize. Mentalizing
ability may well have been a major stimulus for
the development of spoken as well as written
language and their use in teaching. You might
start a writing system based on social signals. If
you wish to use the alphabet, then speech sounds
are key. But whatever you use, a written system of
communication allows knowledge to be conveyed
from one agent to another without them ever meet-
ing each other, thus separating communication from
the very stimuli that normally drive it. In this way,
previous generations can inﬂuence later generations
far into the future.
But even immortalized communication is not
enough to explain cultural evolution. We can also
count on altruistic cooperation (Moll & Tomasello
2007) with the spectacular results produced by stable
social structures, such as cities, markets, temples,
courts of law, prisons, universities, satellite trans-
mission and the Internet. Plentiful examples exist in
science ﬁction to imagine this proliferation even on
your new planet. Now, in human societies, we know
that cooperation is not entirely free of self-interest.
We suggest that one force that drives us to cooperate
is the wish to build a good reputation. A good repu-
tation is of immense value in social interactions. This
is illustrated vividly by the so-called audience effect:
you behave differently, more empathically, more gen-
erously, more honestly, if you are observed by others
(Hoffman et al. 1996).
(f) You build your reputation
Smith (1759) in his ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’
suggested that underlying the drive to acquire wealth
is a more fundamental desire to acquire a good repu-
tation. ‘The rich man glories in his riches, because
he feels that they naturally draw upon him the atten-
tion of the world’ while for the poor man, in
contrast, ‘to feel that we are taken no notice of, necess-
arily damps the most agreeable hope, and disappoints
the most ardent desire, of human nature’ (TMS,
I,III,16). Furthermore, he suggests that ‘Men have
voluntarily thrown away life to acquire after death a
renown which they could no longer enjoy’ (TMS,
III,I,12). The implication here is that the desire to
be noticed and to have a good reputation cannot
only create a drive to acquire wealth, but also a drive
to behave altruistically.
We believe that ostensive signalling is crucial in
building a reputation. Some anecdotal evidence from
real-life trading suggests that this may be so. A new
form of ostensive signalling appears to have evolved
in the move from face-to-face trading pits to anon-
ymous electronic markets. Market trading depends
heavily upon trust, and trust requires that you know
who you are trading with. When face-to-face trading
was replaced by numbers on a computer screen such
identity was no longer supplied. However, in some
supposedly anonymous electronic markets, partici-
pants sometimes signal their identities by offering to
buy not 10 000 000 shares, but 10 000467, or bidding
at $92700 059. Here, the ‘467’ and ‘59’ at the end of
the big numbers act like a codename (Zaloom 2006).
It obviously makes no economic sense to bid $92
700 059 rather than $92 700000. This is the sign of
a deliberate signal indicating that this is ‘$59 trader’
bidding.
(g) You show trust
Deliberate signalling in which both sender and receiver
know that signals are being exchanged is a prime
example of ‘closing the loop’. You need to know that
the alien knows that you are signalling. Further, you
want the alien to believe that you know that it trusts
you. This ‘common knowledge’ is important for main-
taining cooperation in interactive trust games, such
as the Ultimatum game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
If mutual trust breaks down, then cooperation ceases
and both parties suffer through earning less reward.
A real problem for social interactions is how to get
back to a state of cooperation once mutual trust
has been lost. We suggest that, here too, deliberate
signalling has a critical role.
(h) You forgive
In your tentative interactions with the alien, a break-
down has occurred. But your attempts at cementing
a cooperative interaction will not necessarily be
stopped by this. It appears that evolution has biased
humans to behave in a prosocial and cooperative
manner. This seems to be our default mode of behav-
iour when we are not thinking very deeply about what
we are doing (Frith & Frith 2008a). Many economic
games can be played perfectly well at this level. A
simple strategy of tit-for-tat (strict reciprocity:
cooperate if your partner cooperates, defect if he
defects) will usually give the best results (Axelrod &
Hamilton 1981). But what happens when things go
wrong?
Van Lange et al. (2002) examined what happened
when noise was introduced into a trust game. In the
game you are asked to invest money in your partner,
but the amount you invest is randomly altered. As a
result, your partner might receive a smaller than
expected investment. This could easily lead to a break-
down in trust if your partner blames you rather than
the system and returns with an even smaller
investment. Indeed, in the experiments the simple
tit-for-tat strategy no longer maintained cooperation.
However, cooperation could be maintained if a partner
behaved somewhat more cooperatively than the actor
did in the previous interaction (i.e. tit-for-tat plus
one). Forgiving behaviour was also observed by
King-Casas et al. (2008) in a study where the break-
down of cooperation was caused by the abnormal
behaviour of participants with borderline personality
disorder, playing with healthy partners. When this
Review. The social brain U. Frith & C. Frith 171
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)breakdown occurred the healthy partners engaged in
‘coaxing’ behaviour. This was deﬁned as giving back
more than had been offered (i.e. a third or more of
the tripled investment) even though the offer was low
and is similar to Van Lange’s tit-for-tat plus one.
The participants with borderline personality disorder
neither indulged in nor responded to coaxing behav-
iour. One of the more far-ﬂung promises of social
cognitive neuroscience is that studies of this type
could have application in the resolution of
social conﬂict.
3. BEYOND STAR TREK
We have tried to make a case for the central impor-
tance of social signals and have given examples of
how even complex social interactions between two
partners can be brought under experimental control
in the laboratory. How can we use the knowledge
gained so far to improve our often disastrous social
relations in real life? One optimistic example is the
effect of coaxing behaviour in economic games. If
this is the effect of deliberate signalling, then we specu-
late that such paradigms can become tools to probe
potential sources of misunderstanding. For example,
you can sense when a prediction error has occurred
by monitoring not simply what is being said, but why
in this form rather than another, and you do this auto-
matically as you engage in ostensive communication
(Sperber & Wilson 1995). If my partner in trading
pays me back more than I have invested in him, this
is not rational. So, I need another interpretation of
his behaviour. I infer that this is more than an econ-
omic exchange. Rather it is a deliberate signal asking
me to trust him, as he trusts me.
How can impairments in social skills, common in
many psychiatric disorders, be remedied by therapy?
For instance, people with autism, who have problems
with spontaneous theory of mind (Frith 1989, Senju
et al. 2009), should show an absence of regard for
their own reputation, in sharp contrast to their ability
to judge others as being fair or unfair, mean or gener-
ous. We typically show that we have regard for
reputation by the difference in our attitude when we
interact with other people as compared with interact-
ing with a computer. Thus, we might expect people
with autism to make no distinction between computers
and people when playing interactive games. Prelimi-
nary evidence that this is the case comes from the
study by Chiu et al. (2008; see comment by Frith &
Frith 2008b). If this is conﬁrmed, we doubt that it is
wise to focus on improving social skills via robot inter-
actions, notwithstanding the fact that some therapists
keenly advocate such methods. Instead, we look for-
ward to seeing results from learning paradigms,
which investigate the failure to respond to, and get
rewards from social stimuli, and those that test the
speculative hypothesis that people with autism learn
less well from prediction errors about social stimuli.
If this were the case, it might be possible to teach by
eliciting very large prediction errors and decreasing
them very gradually. This is quite the opposite of the
current ideal, which tends to rely on the teacher
behaving in a highly predictable manner.
The young ﬁeld of social cognitive neuroscience
faces many pressing questions. We know very little
about the causes of individual differences in social
abilities and their genetic basis. Can social drugs
such as oxytocin be used to improve social abilities
in autism (Ebstein et al. 2009)? Can they be used
to enhance social ability even in otherwise healthy
people? How do social cognitive abilities develop
in relation to brain maturation? Social abilities are in
evidence at an amazingly young age. Even newborns
orient to faces and voices rather than any other stimuli.
They soak up information from other human beings by
following their gaze and by responding to deliberate
signals of communication. However, we urgently
need to know more about later social development.
Fortunately, adolescence is now being studied as a
phase of brain reorganization concurrent with major
changes in social interests and skills (Blakemore
2008).
Readers will have noticed that we are inveterate
enthusiasts and would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to be sceptical
about the future of social cognitive neuroscience. Of
course, we realize that methodological breakthroughs
are needed to reveal the relevant physiological pro-
cesses in the brain and to link them meaningfully to
mind and behaviour, and we strongly believe that,
to ﬂourish, social cognitive neuroscience must
remain in touch with general cognitive neuroscience.
Many would agree that the most challenging frontier
for the biological sciences now is to understand how
the human brain produces the mind. If it can be
argued that the brain has evolved to enable us to
interact and communicate with each other, then ﬁnd-
ing the basis of this ability will be the key. This is why
we would love to communicate with creatures on
Mars.
We are grateful to Sarah-Jayne Blakemore for her helpful
comments and suggestions. We also thank the Danish
National Research Foundation for ﬁnancial support.
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